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Abstract We assess whether, complementary to trade and financial linkages, banking
sector fragility helps explain the transmission of currency crises. We attempt to strike a
balance between the precision of measurement of banking sector fragility on the one
hand and its consistent measurement across various crisis episodes on the other. We
find that while the role of trade and financial linkages is robust over time, the
independent role of banking sector fragility is rather weak and unstable across crisis
episodes. Consequently it is difficult to extrapolate observed banking fragility
transmission channels from one crisis to another. As a corollary we cannot conclude
that during future crisis episodes economies characterized by fragile banking sectors




Recent currency turbulences in Latin America and Asia have paved the way for a
growing literature around the concept of contagion (e.g. Glick and Rose 1999;V a n
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International Food Policy Research Institute, New Delhi, Indiais to increase our understanding of the diffusion of a shock affecting a particular
“ground-zero” country (hereafter simply ground zero) to other countries. This
entails, on the one hand, the identification of the relevant channels involved and, on
the other hand, an assessment of the stability of their relative weights in the diffusion
process.
1 In this paper we address the first issue. Specifically, we examine whether a
fragile banking sector may explain why the contagious effects of a currency crisis
may hit some countries and by-pass others.
The literature has so far identified trade and financial linkages as the two most
important channels of crisis transmission, while fundamental macroeconomic
variables play only a minor role (e.g. Glick and Rose 1999; Van Rijckeghem and
Weder 2001). The role of trade linkages builds on the argument of competitive
devaluation. Glick and Rose (1999) find empirical support for the trade competition
channel using data on five different currency crises.
2 The role of financial linkages
derives from the common bank lender effect, which builds on risk management
techniques used by banks (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000; Van Rijckeghem and
Weder 2001). The common bank lender effect states that banks—when their
exposures in a particular country are hit by a currency crisis—reduce investments in
related markets, causing a credit crunch there. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)
find a common lender effect in the propagation of the Mexican, Asian, and Russian
crises. As the main creditors tend to concentrate their loans in specific regions in the
world, while trade linkages tend to be predominantly regional as well, both trade and
financial linkages explain the regional pattern of currency crisis transmission.
3
However, their combined explanatory power remains moderate at best, suggesting
that other channels may also exist.
Sbracia and Zaghini (2003) argue that the specificities of banking activities
generate several potential channels for the transmission of currency crises. In
particular, maturity transformation may be at the origins of bank panics, illustrated
by bank runs, leaving the banking system in search of liquidity. In a globally
integrated banking sector, the liquidity crunch can be transmitted to other economies.
To mitigate these problems, international financial authorities have set up rules to
help banks in distress. As a by-product, however, this may introduce moral hazard
behavior that in itself may foster contagious effects. Although the moral hazard
phenomenon is empirically rather hard to measure, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
(1998) use deposit insurance as a proxy and find some support that moral hazard
may explain crisis transmission.
1 One stream of the contagion literature avoids the issue of identifying the transmission channels and looks
for an increase in the market linkages. This approach is generally referred to as shift contagion (e.g. Forbes
and Rigobon 2002; Candelon et al. 2005).
2 The crises are the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the collapse of the Smithsonian
Agreement in 1973, the EMS crisis of 1992–1993, the Mexican meltdown of 1994 and the Asian flu of
1997. These results corroborate findings by for example Eichengreen et al. (1996), Hardy and
Pazarbasioglu (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
3 An interesting identification problem naturally results; though separately trade and financial linkages
perform well in explaining patterns of crisis transmission, together they may be substitutes rather than
complements.
A. Bruinshoofd et al.Although several studies have begun to empirically analyze the role of the
banking sector as a part entière channel of crisis transmission, a systematic analysis
of the role of banking sector fragility as a factor of crisis transmission has yet to be
performed. In this paper we take several steps in that direction by paying closer
attention to the banking sector channels that may help to explain the transmission of
crises. First, we attempt to distinguish the role of banking sector fragility from that of
common lender effects as captured by financial linkages. Second, we aim to do so by
using a data set that only consists of developing and emerging economies, as these
are typically hit hardest by currency crises. While from an econometric point of view
taking on board developed economies would increase the variation in the data and
help us to identify more easily a banking fragility channel, from a policy perspective
this may not subsequently help us identify the most likely victims from among a set
of crisis-prone economies. Third, we focus specifically on whether the banking
fragility channel of crisis transmission is reasonably constant over time. In that
respect we aim to use history as an instrument to check the stability of the banking
fragility channel of crisis transmission. We feel that this is of paramount importance
as only reasonably stable transmission channels are useful for the extrapolation of
future crisis episodes. Linking up with the above we look at crisis transmission
among developing and emerging economies in the Mexican, Asian and Russian
crisis episodes.
Moving back to the early 1990s, the search for data that captures the fragility of
the banking sector in developing and emerging economies is a challenging task. As a
result, we use data that may only imperfectly capture the fragility of a country’s
banking sector. We nevertheless feel that the present paper offers a useful exercise,
let alone for providing additional support for the need to have institutions that
adequately supervise and monitor the international as well as national banking
market.
The natural alternative—studying developed economies or focusing on the
Russian episode alone—would greatly facilitate our access to richer data to assess
banking system fragility and crisis transmission, but leave us guessing whether the
obtained results might extrapolate to developing economies and other crisis
episodes. In this respect Dungey et al. (2006) use very detailed data on the Russian
episode only, while Karas et al. (2006) assess systemic risk in the Russian banking
sector alone using a unique data set on about 1,000 Russian banks. For selected
countries, detailed information on individual banks is available in earlier episodes as
well. For example Bongini et al. (2001, 2002) explore fragility of 282 individual
banks, active in the East Asian countries during the period 1995–1998. They look at
balance sheet information, stock-market based estimates of the implicit cost of
deposit insurance premiums, and grades of rating agencies. This gives much detail,
but as Bongini et al. (2002) forcefully conclude, “it is not possible to generalize [the]
empirical findings to different periods or different countries” (p. 1013).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next two sections outline
our empirical strategy and discuss the role of banking sector fragility as distilled
from the available literature. Section 4 presents the main results. Robustness and
possible extension are explored in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 summarizes and
concludes.
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crises2 Empirical strategy
We are primarily interested in the transmission of currency crises across countries
(cf. Glick and Rose 1999; Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). We therefore analyze
why a crisis in ground zero transmits to some countries, but not to others. The
present analysis considers the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crisis episodes.
Following common patterns, the crisis episodes are correspondingly modeled to
originate with Mexico (December 20, 1994), Thailand (July 2, 1997) and Russia
(August 18, 1998). We test for the existence of crisis transmission by estimating
cross-sectional probit regressions. The probit model has the following form:
INDi;t ¼ !TRDi;t k þ "FINi;t k þ δMCRi;t k þ +BNKi;t k þ "i
with k > 0
t ¼ December 20; 1994; July 2; 1997; August; 18; 1998g:
 
ð1Þ
Here ɛi represents normally distributed error terms and subscript i is a country
index with i=1,…, N (number of countries), while k>0 underscores that we only
include explanatory variables whose information predates the crisis in ground zero.
IND is the binary crisis indicator that equals unity if country i suffered a financial
crisis after a crisis hit ground zero and zero otherwise. We use the crisis
classifications as defined by Glick and Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem and
Weder (2001) who distinguish crisis from non-crisis countries by using journalistic
and academic histories and the views of IMF economists (see Appendix). The
motivation for this choice of crisis indicator is to enable a comparison between our
results and these influential papers.
TRD and FIN are the proxy variables for trade and financial linkages. We control
for trade linkages by including the measures of trade competition in third markets as
defined by Glick and Rose (1999) and applied by Van Rijckeghem and Weder
(2001), among others. This measure of trade competition accounts for the degree to
which any country competes with ground zero in foreign export markets. We control
for financial linkages by considering the measure of funds competition as defined by
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). Funds competition measures the extent to which
country i competes for bank loans from the same lenders as ground zero. MCR
represents a set of macroeconomic control variables that are related to the external
and internal balance of a country prior to the crisis in the ground zero country.
4
These variables are included to account for disequilibria in macroeconomic
fundamentals, which may leave a country vulnerable to a currency crisis as distinct
from trade and financial linkages.
BNK denotes banking sector fragility at the start of a crisis period and determines
the sensitivity of a country to shocks originating in ground zero (e.g. Sachs et al.
1996; Tornell 1999). We intend to capture banking sector fragility by a set of proxy
variables. These variables characterize the relative importance of non-performing
loans and emphasize the risk exposure of banks as measured by liquidity,
profitability and efficiency. Theoretical motivations, as well as availability, quality
4 Detailed descriptions of the trade, financial, and macroeconomic variables are in Appendix.
A. Bruinshoofd et al.and comparability of data across countries serve as a guide through the selection of
our proxy variables (Section 3).
Introducing successively these variables, it is possible to obtain a core model to
explain the international transmission of currency crises (Section 4). Nevertheless,
statistical biases are expected from stepwise regressions as well as from the high
degree of correlation between the proxy variables of banking weakness. The latter
issue is subsequently addressed by means of an exploratory factor analysis, with
which we intend to exploit the correlation among our banking sector fragility proxies
so as to construct a single index of the overall fragility of the banking sector in
Section 6 (cf. e.g. Kaminsky 1998).
3 The role of banking sector weakness in crisis transmission: Theory
and measurement
3.1 Theory
This paper argues that banking sector fragility negatively affects the extent to which
economies can absorb external shocks. The analysis follows Sachs et al. (1996) who
postulate a positive relationship between the weakness of a country’s banking system
and its vulnerability to contagion. In our view, a strong banking sector consists of
banks that only grant loans on which the interest revenues cover all the risks that the
banking sector is exposed to. That is, a strong banking system is comprised of banks
that are able to correctly price the risks associated with the intermediation of funds
such as asset transformation and maturity transformation. A strong banking system
will thus limit the possibility of the transmission of a crisis by reducing transmission
channels due to risk management and asset maturity transformation.
5 This involves
extensive monitoring and screening of debtors by banks and cumulates in the
allocation of financial funds to their most efficient use. The ability of banks to
correctly price risk is reflected in a low share of non-performing loans relative to
loan-loss provisions and in high levels of profits, efficiency, capital, and liquidity.
These factors, in turn, are positively related to the degree of confidence that markets
have in the stability of the banking system. Confidence in the stability of the
financial system is at the core of economic stability, vice versa.
Krugman (1999) argues that the banking system does not have to be weak at the
onset of a financial crisis. The weaknesses may arise in the course of a crisis from a
balance sheet problem of debtors and/or from the loss of investors’ confidence in the
stability of the financial system. Notably, according to Krugman the bad loan
problem is a consequence rather than the cause of a financial crisis. It has its origin
in a transfer problem according to which a reversal in capital inflows necessitates a
reversal in the current account balance from a deficit to a surplus. Indisputably, a fall
in absorption and the corresponding economic downturn worsens the balance sheet
position of debtors and weakens the banking system through its positive effect on the
5 Lindgren et al. (1996) stress low levels of profitability, cash and capitalization, high debt and a high
responsiveness to changes in domestic and foreign interest rates as characterizing factors of a weak
banking system.
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crisesdebt default rate. Banks are assumed to respond to the increase in the debt default
rate by reducing the supply of loans. In restricting the private sector’s access to
external funds, banks cause a credit crunch with detrimental effects on the
performance of the economy. Krugman (1999) reasons that the problem of non-
performing loans does not weaken the banking system per se if banks are re-
capitalized. The bad loan problem only destabilizes the banking system if investors
lose confidence regarding its stability.
Similar to Krugman (1999), Sachs et al. (1996) and Tornell (1999) stress a decline
in absorption and currency devaluation as policies that can be engineered to cope
with contagious effects of shocks originating in the ground zero country (hereafter
simply ground zero). More specifically, Sachs et al. (1996) emphasize that the choice
of the appropriate policy critically depends on the weakness of the banking system at
the start of a crisis period.
6 If the banking system is characterized by a high share of
non-performing loans at the start of a crisis, an engineered recession amplifies the
weakness of the banking system through its positive effect on the debt default rate.
In anticipation of such an effect, Sachs et al. (1996) argue that a government will
advocate currency devaluation rather than a fall in absorption to deal with contagious
effects in the presence of a weak banking system.
Sachs et al. (1996) and Tornell (1999) view bad loans as the outcome of periods
of bank lending booms. These periods are associated with financial market
liberalization; a development which comes along with poor mechanisms of
prudential supervision and regulation.
7 The process of financial market liberalization
has two interrelated implications. First, it increases the willingness and ability of
banks to grant loans. Second, it improves the terms under which debtors can obtain
funds from banks. These aspects, in addition to the lagging development of
expertise, credit market imperfections, and institutional and policy deficiencies
related to bank supervision and regulation imply that banks may not correctly price
risk and may invest in poorly performing projects. The credit expansion
correspondingly increases the average share of bad loans and deteriorates the quality
of the banks’ loan portfolios. This, in turn, increases the sensitivity of the—possibly
undercapitalized—banking systems to reversals in capital inflows.
The inability of banks to correctly price risk is reflected not only in the share of
non-performing loans, but also in the overall cost efficiency, profitability, and
liquidity. These variables co-define the exposure of banks to shocks, determine their
ability to absorb contagious effects and to accommodate bank runs. The level of
bank liquidity at the onset of a foreign crisis matters as it may affect the confidence
of depositors regarding the ability of banks to meet large withdrawals. Depositor
confidence is a necessary—though not a sufficient—condition to avoid a run on
deposits. In order to meet liquidity requirements in the face of large deposit
withdrawals, the banks’ natural response is to curb lending. The contraction in loan
supply has two interdependent effects. First, the credit contraction comes at the
expense of real economic activity through its negative effect on investment and
consumption spending. Second, the credit crunch and the corresponding decline in
6 The models implicitly exclude the possibility that banks are re-capitalized.
7 Corsetti et al. (1998) provides descriptive evidence of the role of excessive lending in a deregulated
banking system as cause of the Asian crisis.
A. Bruinshoofd et al.economic activity worsen the balance sheet position of firms and households and
raise the share of non-performing loans. These developments cause the quality of the
overall loan portfolio to deteriorate and provide additional incentives to withdraw
deposits. The underlying effects are, therefore, self-reinforcing and may cumulate in
a fragile or unsound banking system.
DeYoung and Whalen (1994) argue that the share of non-performing loans
decreases with the cost efficiency of banks. At the core of this relationship is the
notion that efficient banks operate more stringent monitoring standards than
inefficient banks. Assuming a direct positive link between the cost efficiency and
profitability of banks, a virtuous circle may ensure that efficient banks can impose
higher monitoring standards (i.e. can direct expenses foregone elsewhere to the
screening and monitoring of debtors). This reduces credit risk per se and helps to
secure a stable stream of interest income. Furthermore, it adds to the overall level of
capital, which implies that cost-efficient banks are better protected against adverse
developments than cost-inefficient banks. These relationships also explain why a
banking system consisting of efficient banks is likely to absorb shocks and
consequent economic downturns better than one composed of inefficient banks.
Furthermore, Fries et al. (2002) argue that efficient banks abstain from taking
excessive risk if the probability of failure and the consequent loss of capital are
high.
8
It follows from Peek and Rosengreen (2000) and de Haas and van Lelyveld
(2004) that the stability of the banking sector may also depend on the degree of
foreign bank penetration. However, the nature of this relationship is ambiguous.
9
Foreign-owned banks can stabilize the performance of the domestic banking system
if they are more efficient than domestic banks. Relative efficiency gains arise from
cross-border diversification and the exploitation of associated cost-saving scope and/
or scale economies. Closely related to this argument, the geographical scope of
activity enables foreign-owned banks to operate a loan portfolio that is more
diversified and less susceptible to shocks and contagious effects than that of
domestic banks. The presence of foreign-owned banks can also directly stimulate the
stability of the domestic banking system by providing access to new management
techniques and information technologies.
Under some circumstances, however, the presence of foreign-owned banks may
also destabilize the domestic banking system. One argument in this regard stresses
the effect of foreign bank penetration on the degree of short-run concentration of
banks. The entry of foreign banks may reduce the degree of concentration of the
banking sector. If domestic banks fail to adjust to the increased competitive
pressures, the domestic banking sector is likely to be characterized by banking
failures and possibly financial instability. Another argument is that foreign banks
may not be strongly committed to a country, so that they may actually be among the
first to cut their losses when the going gets tough.
10
8 Fries et al. (2002) associate the loss of capital with the loss of the banking license.
9 See De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) for a detailed survey of the positive and negative effects of
foreign bank operation in domestic markets.
10 Morgan et al. (2003) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) take a portfolio view of multinational
banking to support such an argument.
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crises3.2 Measurement
Before turning to the empirical results, we briefly discuss the variables that we use to
proxy banking sector fragility. We use several variables to capture the degree of
credit expansion. Rough measures are claims on the private sector and claims on the
government and other public entities. These variables do not characterize the claim
and do not distinguish the source of claim. More details are embedded in (1)
domestic credit as provided by the banking sector (bank assets) and (2) private credit
as provided by deposit money banks (private credit by banks). Published by the
World Bank, these variables are expressed as a share of GDP.
11 Besides these
variables, the stability of the banking system is approximated as in Sachs et al.
(1996) and Tornell (1999) with a lending boom index that reflects the speed of credit
expansion. This index is computed as the real percentage change in loans that banks
grant to the private sector and to state-owned enterprises over a four-year pre-crisis
period. What all these measures of (excessive) bank credit expansion have in common
is that for each country theoretically an increase in these measurements depicts a
banking sector that is more vulnerable to external shocks, which may increase the
probability that the crisis in ground zero spreads to this particular country.
12
As emphasized, banking system fragility is negatively related to bank liquidity
and profitability. Regarding liquidity, we look at the ratio of bank liquid reserves to
bank assets, where high ratios typically reflect strong banking systems.
13 We also
use information on bank deposits as a share of GDP, which—given the maturity
mismatch—may also signal liquidity risks. Proxy variables of profitability are net
interest rate margins (+) and overhead costs (−). The net interest margin depicts the
relative profitability of interest-bearing assets and overhead costs represent the costs
related to management and administration. As bank profitability increases with net
interest rate margins, ceteris paribus banking sector fragility decreases with it. The
corresponding data are obtained from the World Bank.
14
Besides these factors, the stability of the banking system may also depend on the
degree of foreign bank penetration. In order to test for the importance of foreign
bank penetration as a determinant of bank stability or a possible transmission
channel of contagious shocks, we follow de Haas and van Lelyveld (2004) and
define this variable as follows. Using BIS reporting countries’ data, the proxy
variable is computed as the sum of cross-border claims in all currencies, local claims
in non-local currencies, and local currency claims on local residents less cross-border
claims with head offices outside the country. The result is divided by domestic credit
as contained in the IFS. In order to conclude that foreign bank penetration stabilizes
11 See www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm. The output variables are compiled
using information from the IFS-IMF.
12 This conclusion remains unchanged if we alternatively interpret the measures of (excessive) credit
expansion as indicating the extent to which banks accommodate or propagate instable economic processes
(like asset price bubbles).
13 At the level of individual banks, excessive liquidity may indicate funding problems or other
precautionary motives, thereby pointing to weakness rather than strength. At the level of a country’s
banking sector we do not expect liquidity to pick up this effect though.
14 The data are compiled from the World Development Indicators (CD-Rom 2004) and from www.
worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm.
A. Bruinshoofd et al.the domestic banking system, the resulting coefficient estimates should be negative,
i.e. an increased presence of foreign banks in domestic credit provision reduces the
probability that a currency crisis in ground zero transmits to the domestic economy.
15
Detailed definitions and data sources of the various proxies of the features of
banking sector fragility are in the appendix.
4 Empirical results
The probit model (1) is estimated on a cross-sectional dataset that consists of 48
emerging and developing countries.
16 This is a somewhat smaller number of
countries than included in the dataset used by for example Van Rijckeghem and
Weder (2001), who also include a number of developed European and North
American countries. As explained before, however, we feel that including non-
emerging countries biases both the economic interpretation for emerging countries
and the estimates (by raising the number of non-crisis observations relative to the
number of crisis observations). Missing data causes differences in the number of
countries for which the measures of trade and financial linkages are available in each
of the sampled crisis episodes. The frequency of our data is annual, quarterly or
monthly—depending on the specific variable—and covers the period 1993–1998.
Eq. 1 is estimated for the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises separately using the
traditional maximum likelihood procedure. We also report the z-statistics as well as
the Mc-Fadden R-squared to judge the quality of the specification. In the first
instance, we look at each variable separately to determine its role in the transmission
of the crises in question (see the column headed ‘univariate’ in Table 2). As in Van
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), the correlation matrix (Table 1) reveals that the trade
and funds competition, but also the various banking sector fragility measures
correlate quite strongly, which may lead to identification issues in the multivariate
analysis. In addition to the univariate regressions, we assess for each variable its
explanatory power after controlling for trade and funds competition (see the column
headed ‘multivariate’ in Table 2). The comparison of these two experiments will
indicate to what extent the bank sector fragility measures augment the explanation of
crisis transmission after controlling for what the literature by now considers the
standard trade and finance channels. The results will be discussed more extensively
below. Secondly, a multivariate analysis is performed. In the initial multivariate
model all the banking measures that have explanatory power in the first-pass
regressions are included in a general model. Then, following the general-to-specific
approach, all the variables not significant at a 20% error level are sequentially
removed, leading to the parsimonious models reported in Table 3. The table
additionally reports the model with trade and funds competition alone. In line with
the literature in this field, we find that additional macroeconomic controls (real
exchange rate changes, foreign exchange reserves, government budget and current
15 Alternatively, foreign bank penetration would need to reduce the contagious impact of financial
linkages. We show shortly that such interaction effects have little if any statistical significance in our
analysis.
16 A complete overview of the countries included in the sample is given in Appendix.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency CrisesTable 2 Descriptive statistics per crisis
Variable Number of obs. Country mean values Z-statistic in probit model
a
Crisis Non-crisis Univariate Multivariate
b
Mexican crisis (December 20, 1994)
Funds competition 48 0.67 0.47 2.22*** –
Trade competition 47 0.04 0.02 3.09*** –
Bank assets 42 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.39
Private credit by banks 42 0.45 0.32 1.16 0.77
Bank deposits 44 0.64 0.36 1.34* 1.37*
Domestic credit by banks 47 0.74 0.62 0.71 0.56
Overhead costs 41 0.06 0.04 1.21 0.69
Net interest margin 37 0.07 0.06 0.55 0.40
Claims on the private sector 22 0.48 0.35 0.84 1.03
Claims on the government 22 0.05 0.11 –1.00 –1.20
Bank liquid reserves 46 0.12 0.16 –1.01 –0.70
Lending boom 33 0.89 0.22 2.16*** 1.53*
Foreign bank penetration 47 0.04 0.01 1.79** 1.66**
Foreign assets price risk 41 0.31 0.23 0.00 –0.04
Loans to deposits 42 0.85 2.34 –0.39 –1.40
Foreign funding 39 0.26 0.12 1.31* 1.43*
Asian crisis (July 2, 1997)
Funds competition 48 0.57 0.41 2.78*** –
Trade competition 47 0.15 0.04 3.05*** –
Bank assets 47 0.54 0.39 1.68** 0.61
Private credit by banks 46 0.46 0.31 1.80** 0.45
Bank deposits 47 0.38 0.36 0.24 0.04
Domestic credit by banks 47 0.69 0.54 0.92 0.22
Overhead costs 47 0.04 0.05 –1.70** –0.42
Net interest margin 45 0.05 0.06 –1.32* –0.81
Claims on the private sector 27 0.36 0.21 0.68 –0.53
Claims on the government 27 0.10 0.06 0.66 0.66
Bank liquid reserves 46 0.11 0.14 –0.79 –0.20
Lending boom 42 0.54 0.37 0.86 –0.42
Foreign bank penetration 48 0.02 0.01 1.48* 0.96
Foreign assets price risk 47 0.06 –0.11 1.98*** 0.61
Loans to deposits 46 7.22 1.24 0.98 0.75
Foreign funding 46 0.15 0.11 0.63 1.41*
Russian crisis (August 18, 1998)
Funds competition 48 0.57 0.56 –0.32 –
Trade competition 47 0.05 0.03 2.21*** –
Bank assets 47 0.50 0.48 0.15 –1.06
Private credit by banks 47 0.45 0.39 0.57 –0.79
Bank deposits 47 0.47 0.40 0.65 0.10
Domestic credit by banks 47 0.61 0.66 –0.33 –1.56*
Overhead costs 48 0.05 0.04 1.45* 2.42***
Net interest margin 46 0.07 0.05 1.38* 1.79**
Claims on the private sector 28 0.46 0.41 0.28 –0.72
Claims on the government 28 0.03 0.09 –1.39* –1.51*
Bank liquid reserves 46 0.09 0.12 –1.07 –0.35
Lending boom 43 0.36 0.53 –0.98 –1.39*
Foreign bank penetration 48 0.09 0.01 0.55 0.64
Foreign assets price risk 45 –0.00 –0.05 0.44 –0.02
Loans to deposits 47 0.94 3.43 –0.58 –0.71
Foreign funding 46 0.17 0.11 1.01 0.81
Lending boom is defined as the 4-year percentage change in the ratio of the size of the claims of the
banking sector (demand deposit banks and monetary authorities) on the private sector to GDP (cf. Sachs et
al. 1996)
aSignificance at the 20%, 10%, and 5% error level is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively
bThe multivariate results evaluate the additional explanatory power of the respective variable in a model
that already incorporates trade and funds competition
A. Bruinshoofd et al.account deficits and so on) have no additional explanatory power (e.g. Van
Rijckeghem and Weder 2001. Also see Table 10 of Appendix), limiting the support
of a fundamentals-based view of the transmission of the crises. By contrast, we find
that our measures of banking sector fragility do add some explanatory power after
controlling for trade and financial linkages.
17 From Table 3 we also note that the
explanatory power of our models (represented by the McFadden R-squared) is lower
than that in Glick and Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). Such a
result is inherent to the different sample we consider. As we exclude industrialized
countries, the relative number of countries facing a currency crisis increases in our
data set compared to the data sets used by Glick and Rose (1999) or Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2001), leading to a lower explanatory power. By focusing primarily on
emerging economies, we face a more difficult task in separating those prone to
contagion in any particular crisis. Yet at the same time we feel that any result will be
far more powerful in understanding which countries, from a sample of countries that
have demonstrated strong sensitivity to crisis contagion, are most at risk at any point
in time. We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the results for each crisis
period separately.
4.1 The Mexican crisis
The Mexican crisis was spurred by a number of interacting factors related to
regulatory deficiencies, credit growth, political uncertainty, and adverse external







Constant –2.14*** –2.77*** –2.43*** –2.68*** –0.29 –1.02
(–2.84) (–2.92) (–2.74) (–2.49) (–0.38) (–1.12)
Funds competition 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.02 –0.01 –0.03**
(0.32) (0.61) (1.32) (1.12) (–0.89) (–1.83)
Trade competition 0.40*** 0.36** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.28***
(2.07) (1.67) (2.59) (2.77) (2.34) (3.12)








McFadden R-squared 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.09 0.30
Observations 47 46 46 45 47 44
LR Statistic 11.04*** 13.98*** 18.16*** 19.50*** 5.87** 18.00***
Probit estimates of our binary crisis variables (as defined by Glick and Rose 1999 and Van Rijckeghem
and Weder 2001) with z-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the 20%, 10%, and 5% error level is
indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively
17 The McFadden R-squared increases when measures of banking sector fragility are taken on board.
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crisesdevelopments. In the course of the 1980s, Mexico experienced rapid economic growth
that was induced by the liberalization of capital and trade flows. In the presence of a
crawling pegged exchange rate system and low US interest rates, this development
induced large capital inflows. At the same time, deregulation of the financial sector, a
prosperous economic outlook, and a decline in public indebtedness triggered excessive
credit growth. Given weak supervisory capacities, an absence of bank reserve require-
ments, the lack of expertise by undercapitalized financial institutions, and the
consequent moral hazard problem, the lending boom deteriorates the quality of banks’
loanportfolios.Furthermore,instimulatingcapitalinvestmentandprivateconsumption,
the credit boom contributed to the emergence of an external deficit. This was largely
financed by short-term USD denominated capital and became increasingly unsustain-
able given imprudent investment. The financial crisis erupted in December 1994.
Tables 2 and 3 gather the results of our investigation concerning the transmission
of the Mexican crisis. Firstly we observe that individually, measures of banking
sector fragility (deposits by banks, lending boom, and foreign bank penetration) have
significant explanatory power. Due to their correlation with trade and funds
competition, however, only foreign bank penetration augments the multivariate
model. It turns out that the transmission of the Mexican crisis follows both trade and
funds competition patterns. These results provide a mixed view on the origins of the
Mexican crisis. The trade channel supports a second-generation model for the
transmission of a currency crisis. Third generation models of currency crises also
incorporate credit cycle models where the financial crisis originates with the asset
side of banks’ balance sheets (e.g. Breuer 2004). This is in line with the observation
that contaminated countries are more strongly in competition for funds with Mexico
than the countries that remain unaffected by the contagious effects of the Mexican
crisis. Hence, the crisis also tended to be transmitted via common lenders (cf. Van
Rijckeghem and Weder 2001; Sbracia and Zaghini 2003). Additionally, some of our
indicators of banking sector fragility correlate with the crisis indicator, lending
credence to the view that the transmission of the Mexican crisis was predominantly
to countries that had recently experienced an overexpansion of bank credit (cf. Sachs
et al. 1996; Tornell 1999). Specifically, contaminated countries experienced a
lending boom in the run-up to the tequila crisis, resulting in a larger share of bank
assets to total financial assets.
18 Interestingly, countries in which foreign banks had
been more involved were also more likely to catch a tequila hangover as indicated
by the higher value of foreign bank penetration for the crisis countries.
19 Caution is
required when interpreting this result. It may suggest that foreign banks provide
instability to our sample-countries because they also tend also to be the first ones to
run when the going gets tough. However, foreign bank penetration may also reflect
implicit or explicit guarantees on deposits provided by the host country. International
19 Interaction effects—defined as the product of foreign bank penetration and funds competition—turn out
insignificant. Hence we cannot conclude that the Mexican crisis spreads to countries with a strong
presence of foreign banks that also have large exposures in Mexico.
18 In itself, a lending boom may point to a first-generation crisis, indicating an overall excessive growth in
domestic credit. Our broader results suggest that it is the share of bank lending in total lending that drives
our result. Moreover, unreported results show no signs of crisis countries running excessive budget
deficits, the required closing piece of the first-generation view on currency crises.
A. Bruinshoofd et al.banks have larger incentives to branch out to those host countries that provide some
form of deposit insurance guarantees, rather than to hosts that do not. Deposit
insurance guarantees create moral hazard on the part of the decisions of both local
and international banks and may make the system as a whole vulnerable to shocks
(cf. Sbracia and Zaghini 2003). Alternatively, foreign bank penetration may reflect a
high degree of financial openness and, as Kaminsky et al. (2003) point out, markets
that are easily accessible and liquid are very sensitive to capital flight when hit by
shocks. In addition to the variables reported in the table, we correlate a number of
the more traditional macroeconomic control variables with the crisis index, such as
GDP growth, the trade deficit, the budget deficit, interest rates, foreign exchange
reserves, and the real exchange rate. None of these variables by themselves explain
the transmission of the Mexican crisis (see Table 10 in Appendix).
4.2 The Asian crisis
A multitude of interdependent domestic and external factors are at the origin of the
Asian crisis. The main cause of the East Asian crisis was a moral hazard problem at
the corporate, financial, and international level during the process of financial market
liberalization in the 1990s. Corsetti et al. (1998) attribute the moral hazard problem
to structural and policy distortions in the corporate and financial sectors. Distortions
at the corporate level arose from public guarantees to favored private sectors and
from bailout policies that created an environment of certainty regarding the return on
risky and financially unsound investment projects.
Despite the low profitability of investment, investment rates in Asia were high.
High investment was financed with credit from domestic financial institutions that
borrowed heavily from abroad. The implications of these developments were twofold.
Firstly, in lacking sound supervision, strong regulation, and transparency, the
willingness of financial institutions to channel funds toward risky projects resulted
in an undercapitalized financial system with a growing share of non-performing loans.
Secondly, high investment rates stirred overheating pressures, inflated stock and real
estate prices, and contributed to the emergence of current account deficits. The
emergence of an external deficit was dangerous since the low profitability of the
investment projects did not match the costs of borrowing funds from abroad.
The sustained high investment rates and subsequent overheating pressures were
also fuelled by the maintenance of fixed exchange rate regimes. These offered
implicit guarantees of exchange value and, through this effect, improved external
access to especially short-term foreign-currency denominated funds. The consequent
excessive exposure to foreign exchange risk increased the susceptibility of
economies to external shocks. Next to these effects, the operation of fixed exchange
rate regimes magnified the fragility of the Asian economies to adverse terms of trade
shocks and to the consequent loss in external competitiveness as of the second half
of 1995. Because most Asian countries were open to and interdependent with each
other, adverse foreign demand shocks and terms of trade shocks had a pronounced
negative effect on the performance of Asian economies in the second half of the
1990s. The external and domestic shocks revealed the fragility of the Asian countries
that ultimately induced the eruption of the crisis in Thailand and through trade and
financial linkages the subsequent collapse of other countries.
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency CrisesResults of our estimations as gathered in Tables 2 and 3 support this analysis.
Trade and funds competition both exhibit a statistically significant explanation of the
transmission of the Asian crisis in the univariate as well as the multivariate models.
Some of the measures of banking sector fragility explain crisis transmission
univariately, but also correlate strongly with trade and funds competition so that they
fail to add explanatory power in the multivariate models. The only exception is
provided by foreign funding, but even this variable is only marginally significant
when trade and funds competition are accounted for. Similar to the transmission of
the Mexican crisis, the Asian crisis also transmits to countries broadly in accordance
with patterns of trade and funds competition (cf. Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001).
In addition, there is ample evidence in Table 2 to support the view that Bahtulism
spread to countries where the banking sector tended to have over-expanded its credit
to the private sector, while at the same time seeming to have been more vulnerable to
changes in the exchange rate. In particular, the table shows that bank assets (relative
to GDP) was some fifteen percentage points higher in the crisis countries in
comparison with the non-crisis countries. A similar result is obtained for private
credit provision by banks. Sensitivity to exchange rate changes follows from the
considerably higher foreign assets price risk for crisis countries, reflecting that the
banking sectors in these countries were heavy net borrowers in foreign currency
prior to the Asian crisis. Strikingly, the banking sectors in crisis countries also appear
more efficient than their counterparts in non-crisis countries, as follows from the
comparison of overhead costs. As Bongini et al. (2001) suggest, however, this may
reflect prior forbearance from prudential regulations by supervisors at the onset of
the Asian crisis and contribute to the view of the crisis transmitting to countries with
over exposed banking sectors. In line with a camouflaged weakness of the banking
sector, we find that of the miscellaneous macroeconomic controls, the short-term
interest rate tended to be lower in crisis countries prior to the collapse of the Thai
Baht (see Table 10 in Appendix). This feature quickly disappeared when markets
brought down the Thai currency.
4.3 The Russian crisis
The Russian crisis begins on August 18, 1998 when Russian authorities
acknowledge the impossibility to fix the Russian Ruble to the US Dollar. Several
studies have attempted to understand this event. The financing of the heavy public
deficit via public securities (GKO) mainly bought by the big Russian commercial
banks is often considered as the main explanation for this financial crisis (see Sutela
2000).
20 By increasing the amount of government securities, commercial banks have
increased their risk exposure for three main reasons. First, they over-substituted
short-run deposits to long run assets, creating excessive imbalances in the maturity
structure of their balance sheets. Second, most of the big Russian commercial banks
were partially held by foreign investors. It has thus amplified the role of foreigners in
this market, leading to a heavy rush for selling these government bonds in early
August 1998 and the cessation of payment on the 18th Augustus.
21 Third,
20 In 1997, about two thirds of the GKO market was held by the largest commercial banks.
21 In 1998, 30% of the GKO were owned by foreigners.
A. Bruinshoofd et al.commercial banks have realized important off-balance sheet operations (especially
forward contracts signed by foreigners for the purpose of hedging their exchange
rate risk), leading to the amplification of the banking crisis.
The situation of the Russian banking sector is thus quite weak before the 1998
crisis. In addition, with the Russian crisis erupting hardly more than a year after the
Asian crisis, it may find many countries more sensitive to contagious effects than
they were on the eve of the previous two crises. This alone may account for the fact
that the Russian crisis tends to spread more across different regions (see Table 7 in
Appendix). It turns out that—as in the Mexican and Asian crises—the Russian crisis
spreads via the trade channel (see the univariate results in Table 2). In contrast with
its predecessors, the funds competition channel does not appear to play a significant
role in the Russian episode. As before, we do find that patterns of banking sector
fragility can explain which countries suffered from the Russian crises, but the
channel appears slightly different from both crises discussed before. Specifically, the
Russian crisis did not spread, as did the Mexican crisis, to those countries that
exhibited a boom in bank lending. Similarly, the crisis did not spread to countries
whose banking sectors were overexposed to currency realignments, as in the Asian
crisis. Rather, the Russian crisis infected those countries where the banking sectors
exhibited cost inefficiencies. Contrary to the Mexican and Asian crises, our measure
of inefficiency -overhead costs- now has some explanatory power in the univariate
as well as the multivariate models. The risks attached to inefficiencies in the banking
sectors are also reflected in higher short-term interest rates in the crisis countries
many months in advance of the crisis, demonstrating that in this instance at least,
markets were not caught by surprise (also see Table 10 in Appendix). Of course, the
evidence in DeYoung and Whalen (1994), at the level of individual banks, show that
weak banks may display operating inefficiencies as far as six years prior to actual
failure. In that regard, inefficiencies at the level of the banking sector may be
identified by financial markets well in advance of a crisis. The international risk
premiums applying to countries that would subsequently suffer the contagious
effects of the Russian crisis were also reflected by the fact that the banking sectors in




To asses the robustness of the previous results, we first consider the potential
regional patterns in the transmission of currency crisis. Due to stronger economic
and political linkages, it is likely that the countries belonging the same region as the
‘ground-zero’ country will be more affected than the other ones. Glick and Rose
(1999) in particular find some empirical support for such a stylized fact. Our
empirical test for a regional transmission of the crisis is set up via four dummies
indicating the geographical localization of the country i. The dummy LATINi (resp.
ASIAi, AFRICAi, EUROi) takes a 1 if the country i belongs to the Latin American
(resp. Asian, African, Eastern Europe) region.
22 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency CrisesThe multivariate probit model 1 can be then restated as follows:
INDi;t ¼!TRDi;t k þ "FINi;t k þ δMCRi;t k þ +BNKi;t k þ μ1LATINi
þ μ2ASIAi þ μ3AFRICAi þ μ4EUROi þ "i
with k > 0
t ¼ December 20; 1994; July 2; 1997; August 18; 1998 fg :
ð2Þ
Here ɛi represents normally distributed error terms and subscript i is a country
index with i=1,…, N (number of countries), while k>0 underscores that we only
include explanatory variables whose information predates the crisis in ground zero.
Table 4 gathers the results of the estimations for the three crises under study. It
turns out that the trade and fund competitions as well as our measure of banking
sector fragility have similar coefficients as those obtained with Eq. 1, i.e. without
regional dummies. Focusing on the purely regional transmission of the crises, our
results do not provide support for it. First, none of the regional dummies indicating
the geographical location in Africa and Eastern Europe are significant (AFRICAi,







Constant –4.38*** –5.01*** –2.37*** –2.70*** –1.94** –2.29**
(–2.30) (–2.36) (–2.33) (–2.19) (–1.63) (–1.80)
Funds competition 0.02 0.02 0.02* 0.02 0.01 –0.02
(0.71) (0.82) (1.25) (1.02) (0.36) (–0.71)
Trade competition 0.55*** 0.55** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.46***
(2.00) (1.86) (2.19) (2.35) (2.41) (2.92)








Latin America 0.07 0.32 –0.03 –0.06 1.38*** 2.03**
(0.09) (0.39) (–0.04) (–0.09) (2.37) (1.87)
Asia 1.68*** 1.54** 0.11 0.29 0.08 –0.93
(2.30) (1.90) (0.17) (0.45) (0.17) (–1.38)
Africa 0.00 0.00 –0.18 –0.32 –0.21 –0.73**
(0.01) (0.01) (–0.20) (–0.34) (0.24) (–0.62)
Europe 1.61 1.89* –0.02 0.14 –0.26 0.50**
(1.36) (1.41) (–0.03) (0.18) (–0.36) (–0.46)
McFadden R-squared 0.40 0.45 0.33 0.37 0.24 0.49
Observations 47 46 46 45 47 44
LR Statistic 18.36*** 18.93*** 18.26*** 19.97*** 14.82** 28.94***
Probit estimates of our binary crisis variables (as defined by Glick and Rose 1999 and Van Rijckeghem
and Weder 2001) with Z-statistics in parentheses. Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe are dummy
variable indicating the regional origin of the country. Significance at the 20%, 10%, and 5% error level is
indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively
A. Bruinshoofd et al.EUROi). This result holds in particular in the case of the Russian 1998 crisis.
Second, in the case of the Asian crisis, none of the regional dummies are significant.
The only cases for which regional dummies are significant is the Asian dummy
during the Mexican 1994 crisis and the Latin American dummy during the Russian
1998 crisis. One possible explanation for the rejection of the regional aspect of the
transmission of the crisis may be that trade and fund competition already integrate
the regional dimension, leading to a redundant measure of the regional dummies.
The second robustness check deals with the amplifying role of the banking sector
of traditional channels of crisis transmission. It is likely that the banking sector
fragility does not act as a proper channel of transmission but as an amplifier for the
trade and funds competition channels. The test for such a hypothesis requires a non-
linear specification of Eq. 1, as follows.
INDi;t ¼ !TRDi;t k þ "FINi;t k þ MCRi;t k þ υ1BNKi;t k:TRDi;t k
þ υ2BNKi;t k:FINi;t k þ "i
with k > 0
t ¼ December 20; 1994; July;2 1997;August 18; 1998 fg :
ð3Þ
In such a case, banking sector fragility amplifies the existing transmission
channels if υ1 and/or υ2 are significantly different from 0. For each of our measure of
banking fragility, Eq. 3 is estimated and the significance of υ1 and υ2 is test via z-
statistics. Table 5 reports the results obtained. It turns out that in general the non-
linear specification is not supported by the data (υ1 and υ2 is always insignificantly
different from 0, excepting foreign bank penetration in the Asian episode and foreign
funding for the Asian and Mexican crises). It thus indicates that the hypothesis
according to which banking fragility modifies the existing transmission channels of
the crisis, is not supported by the data.
6 Possible extensions: exploring banking sector fragility factors
Our analysis so far aimed at capturing banking sector fragility through a set of proxy
variables that most likely than not correlate with fragility, even though none of them
provides a precise measurement. As a corollary, we are faced with strongly correlated
explanatory variables in our regression analyses. In this section we specifically aim to
exploit the strong correlations among our various fragility proxies in a factor analysis,
wherebyweessentiallyintendtoextractthecommon,unobservablefactor(s)thatdrive(s)
these correlations. The loadings of the individual proxy variables on the factor(s) tell us
whether the factor(s) indeed capture(s) banking sector fragility. We start the factor
analysis among the largest possible set of banking fragility proxy variables, which we
refer to as the broad search.
23 Additionally, the analysis has been conducted on a
23 A glance at Table 9 in Appendix reveals that a similar approach to the set of macroeconomic variables
looks considerably less promising. Also, the correlation among the banking fragility indicators is typically
much stronger than that between the banking fragility indicators and our macroeconomic controls.
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crisesnarrower set of banking sector variables, which we refer to as the narrow search (we
motivate this shortly). Table 6 summarizes the results.
For the purpose of the factor analysis even the largest possible set of proxy
variables cannot include all the variables that we consider in Tables 1 and 2 in the
Table 5 Descriptive statistics per crisis
Variable Number
of obs.






Mexican crisis (December 20, 1994)
Bank assets 42 –0.19 –0.17
Private credit by banks 42 0.51 –0.35
Bank deposits 43 –0.36 0.67
Domestic credit by banks 46 0.65 –0.57
Overhead costs 41 –0.36 0.67
Net interest margin 37 –0.08 0.12
Claims on the private sector 22 –0.02 –0.06
Claims on the government 22 –0.39 0.52
Bank liquid reserves 46 0.21 –0.50
Lending boom 33 –0.61 0.53
Foreign bank penetration 47 –0.08 0.62
Foreign assets price risk 41 0.58 0.13
Loans to deposits 41 0.59 –1.50*
Foreign funding 38 1.61* –1.45*
Asian crisis (July 2, 1997)
Bank assets 47 0.09 0.04
Private credit by banks 46 –0.68 1.07
Bank deposits 45 0.22 –0.35
Domestic credit by banks 45 –0.22 0.59
Overhead costs 47 0.22 –0.35
Net interest margin 45 –0.47 0.50
Claims on the private sector 27 –0.93 0.79
Claims on the government 27 0.14 –0.79
Bank liquid reserves 46 0.53 –0.24
Lending boom 42 1.00 –1.19
Foreign bank penetration 48 1.65** 1.48*
Foreign assets price risk 47 0.88 –0.69
Loans to deposits 44 –0.54 1.31
Foreign funding 44 1.44* –0.32
Russian crisis (August 18, 1998)
Bank assets 47 −0.89 0.58
Private credit by banks 47 −0.35 0.12
Bank deposits 47 −0.43 0.58
Domestic credit by banks 46 0.005 −0.53
Overhead costs 48 0.05 1.08
Net interest margin 46 v0.45 0.32
Claims on the private sector 28 −0.96 0.70
Claims on the government 28 0.41 −0.14
Bank liquid reserves 46 0.03 −0.53
Lending boom 43 −0.24 −0.52
Foreign bank penetration 48 0.34 -0.21
Foreign assets price risk 45 0.29 −0.30
Loans to deposits 47 0.77 −0.90
Foreign funding 46 −0.001 0.22











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crisesmain text. Specifically, claims on the private sector, claims on the government, and
lending boom are always excluded from the factor analysis because their inclusion
seriously limits the number of relevant observations. As it is, we are left with
relatively few observations compared to the number of variables that we consider.
This results in the analysis in so-called Heywood results, where identified factors are
heavily or fully dominated by a single variable. While we also look at scree-plots
and AIC and BIC model selection criteria, our broad search for fragility factors is
heavily constrained by the maximum number of factors we may contain without
arriving at a Heywood solution. Thus we retain only a single factor in each of the
three crisis episodes.
The resulting outcomes show remarkably similar features across the episodes.
Specifically, the factors are heavily loaded on the variables that capture the size of
the banking sector in the respective economies; bank assets to GDP, private credit by
banks, deposits by banks, and domestic credit provided by banks. Hence we label
this factor banking system size. In a sense, then, we have failed in our attempt to
capture banking sector fragility as a large banking system by no means necessarily
coincides with a fragile one. As a corollary, we find that these factors never add
explanatory power to our crisis transmission model, as evidenced by the low z-scores
that are reported in the bottom two lines of the table.
In an attempt to better capture the fragility factor that we believe is also
incorporated in our banking variables, we drop the four variables that associate most
strongly with banking system size and conduct a narrow search for fragility. The
narrow search too suffers from Heywood problems. Specifically, in the Mexican and
Russian episodes we are forced to drop overhead costs because otherwise all models
are Heywood solutions.
24 Having done so, however, we are still unable to identify a
single factor that captures fragility in the Mexican episode (the likelihood ratio test
that the independent factor model resembles that saturated model cannot be
rejected). In the Asian as well as the Russian episodes we have a saturated model
with two factors. As before, the resulting outcomes are remarkably similar.
Specifically, the first factor captures economies where the banking sector is
characterized by low overhead costs and low interest margins. We label this factor
fragility on account of its positive loading on loans to deposits and foreign asset
price risk and its negative loading on bank liquidity. The second factor characterizes
economies where the banking sector is characterized by heavy reliance on foreign
funding as well as strong presence of foreign banks. We therefore label this factor
foreign presence.
As the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the last lines of Table 6 report the z-
scores of fragility and foreign presence when they are added as explanatory variables
to our crisis transmission model. In the Asian episode fragility adds to the
explanation of crisis transmission when we look at the univariate model. However,
the information value in fragility i sa l r e a d ye m b o d i e di nt r a d ea n df u n d s
competition, as indicated by its insignificance in the multivariate model. In the
24 Specifically in the Russian episode, this corroborates our earlier result that overhead costs exert an
independent effect on the probability of crisis transmission.
A. Bruinshoofd et al.Russian episode there is no evidence that fragility (which does not take into account
overhead costs) adds to the explanation of crisis transmission. There is some weak
evidence that foreign presence may associate with crisis transmission in the
univariate model, but this effects does not persist in the multivariate specification.
At the end of the day, therefore, our exploratory factor analysis does not add to the
understanding of the transmission of currency crises that we already gathered in the
stepwise analysis discussed in the previous section.
7 Conclusion
We assess whether, complementary to trade and financial linkages, banking sector
fragility helps explain the transmission of currency crises among developing and
emerging economies. Our focus is on banking fragility transmission channels that
are reasonably stable across crisis episodes, so that we may extrapolate them and
predict the incidence of future crisis transmission. This requires us to strike a balance
between the precision of measurement of banking sector fragility on the one hand,
and its consistent measurement across various crisis episodes on the other.
Our results demonstrate that while the role of trade and financial linkages in crisis
transmission is robust over time, an independent role of banking sector fragility is
rather weak and unstable across crisis episodes. Although banking sector fragility
correlates with the transmission of currency crises, it does not appear to do so
independently from trade and financial linkages. This makes the identification of a
banking fragility transmission channel a precarious exercise. Furthermore, banking
fragility seems to manifest itself in different guises over time: the Mexican crisis
spreads to countries with fast growth of domestic credit and a stronger presence of
foreign banks; the Thai crisis is also transmitted to those countries whose banking
credit grew rapidly, but additionally to countries that exhibited stronger exposure to
currency realignments; the Russian crisis, by contrast, spread predominantly to
countries that displayed inefficiencies in their banking sectors in the form of high
overhead costs. Consequently it is difficult to extrapolate observed banking fragility
transmission channels from one crisis to another. As a corollary, our results do not
provide a strong case that banking sector fragility measures would add a lot of
predictive power in the construction of early warning indicators.
Our results also reveal that the characterization of banking sector fragility by a
common factor analysis leads to inconclusive results. This paves the way for more
comprehensive analyses into the unique contribution of various aspects of the
banking sector to overall banking sector fragility. In addition, our measurement of
banking sector fragility at the macro-economic level cannot be precise, calling for
the use of micro-data, specifically on (the distribution of) nonperforming loans in the
banking sector as well as market-based assessments on bank fragility. Various
studies are indeed exploring such avenues. However, such data are not widely
available for developing and emerging economies or in long time series, thus leaving
most of these studies assessing only specific countries or crisis episodes, typically
the Russian episode. While highly interesting regarding their insights into the role of
banking sector fragility in crisis transmission, they leave us guessing as to whether
these channels can be extrapolated to future crisis episodes. Put differently, we
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crisescannot be sure that observed banking sector fragility channels in a particular crisis
episode are typical for that specific episode or more fundamental and to be expected
to play a role in future contagious episodes as well.
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Appendix: Variable Description
Crisis indicator
Table 7 lists which countries are being treated as crisis countries in each crisis
episode.
Trade indicator
The definition of the trade variable follows Glick and Rose (1999), who define trade












     





     





where k 6¼ i;0. The variables xi. and x0. denote aggregate exports from country i and
“ground zero country”,r e s p e c t i v e l y .xik and x0k represent exports from country i and
“ground zero country” to country k. The first component on the right-hand-side
depicts the importance of country k as an export destination for country i and the
“ground zero country” relative to aggregate exports of country i and “ground zero
country”. The second term denotes the relative importance of country k as an
exporting destination of “ground zero country” and country i and, hence, the extent to
which both countries compete to export to country k. A high value of this index points
to a high degree of competition between “ground zero country” and country i in third
markets. We use the IMF International Trade Statistics data base to construct TRD.
Finance indicator
Following Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), the measure of competition for funds
in third markets applies the measure of trade competition in shares (A3) to flows of
international bank loans. In this application xok and xik in the above definition of TRD
now represent bank loans from country k to “ground zero country” and country 1,
respectively, while x0. and xi. denote total bank loans to “ground zero country” and
A. Bruinshoofd et al.country i. A high value of the funds competition measure suggests strong competition
between country i and the “ground zero country” for bank loans from the same third
markets. Competition for funds is computed from bi-yearly information on the
consolidated banking activities by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). To be
Country Mexican crisis Asian crisis Russian crisis
Argentina 1 1 1
Bolivia 0 0 1
Brazil 1 1 1
Chile 0 0 0
Colombia 0 0 1
Costa Rica 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 1 1
Ecuador 0 0 1
Egypt 0 0 0
Ghana 0 0 0
Greece 0 0 0
Hong Kong 1 – 1
Hungary 1 1 0
India 0 0 0
Indonesia 1 1 1
Israel 0 0 0
Jordan 0 0 0
Kenya 0 0 0
Korea 0 0 1
Latvia 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 1 0
Mauritius 0 0 0
Mexico – 11
Morocco 0 0 0
Nigeria 0 0 0
Pakistan 0 1 1
Panama 0 0 0
Peru 1 0 0
Philippines 1 1 0
Poland 0 1 1
Portugal 0 0 0
Russia 0 0 –
Singapore 0 1 0
South Africa 0 1 1
Sri Lanka 0 0 1
Thailand 1 – 1
Turkey 0 0 1
Ukraine 0 0 1
Uruguay 0 0 1
Venezuela 1 0 1
Zimbabwe 0 0 0
Japan 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 0
Slovakia 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0
Estonia 0 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0
Table 7 Crisis (1)
and non-crisis (0) countries
Source: Glick and Rose (1999)
and Van Rijckeghem and Weder
(2001). Glick and Rose rely on
The Financial Times reports
mainly to identify the victims
of the transmission of the
Mexican and Asian crisis. Van
Rijckeghem and Weder construct
an analogous crisis indicator
based on the views of IMF
economists to determine if a
country suffered from contagion
in the wake of the Russian crisis
Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crisesmore precise, the variable is constructed by considering aggregate bank loans from the
BIS reporting countries to our sample countries.
25
Macroeconomic indicators
The internal and external balance can be approximated by a multitude of economic
variables.
26 Using the International Financial Statistics (IFS) publications of the
IMF, we include the pre-crisis current account deficit, the pre-crisis ratio of domestic
liquidity to international reserves, real GDP growth, the government budget deficit
as a percentage of GDP, growth of credit to the private sector, the ratio of short-term
debt to international reserves, and the short-term interest rate as measure of financial
market pressure. Furthermore, we incorporate the pre-crisis rate of real appreciation.
Ideally, the degree of exchange rate under-valuation should be measured using a
trade-weighted index of real exchange rates (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001).
Because real effective exchange rate data are only available for a small sample of
countries, the present analysis approximates the under-valuation of the currency by
means of the bilateral real exchange rate defined in terms of U.S. dollars. Since the
bilateral and effective real exchange rate are strongly correlated for those countries
for which both measures are available, the empirical results are not expected to
depend on our alternative definition of the real exchange rate.
Banking indicators
Table 8 summarizes the definition of the indicators of banking sector fragility and
the corresponding data sources.
25 The BIS reporting countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland.
26 Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) include 18 financial and macroeconomic time series. Details are in
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Kaminsky (1998).
A. Bruinshoofd et al.Table 8 Indicators of banking sector fragility
Variable Definition Freq.













Private credit by deposit
money banks (% GDP).
A 1993 1996 1997
Deposits by
banks
Demand, time, and saving
deposits in deposit money
banks (% GDP).
A 1993 1996 1997
Overhead costs Accounting value of a
banking system overhead
costs as share oftotalassets.




banking system net interest
revenue as share of
earning assets.




Computed as the ratio of
private credit by banks to
deposits by banks.
A 1993 1996 1997
Claims on the
private sector
Claims on the private sector
(% GDP).






Claims on the government
and other public entities
(% GDP).




Domestic credit provided by
banks (% GDP).




Bank liquid reserves to
bank asset ratio.
A 1993 1996 1997
Lending boom
index
The real percentage change in
loans that banks grant to the
private sector and to state-
owned enterprises over a
four-year pre-crisis period.





Combination of BIS data on
consolidated international
bank claims and Bankscope
data on lending by foreign
bank subsidiaries and
domestic banks.







assets over DMB’s claims
on the private sector.





Foreign funding Consolidated claims of
reporting BIS countries on
individual countries’
banking sector relative to
total bank assets.
A 1993 1997 1996 BIS consolidated
banking statistics
a‘Frequency’ describes the frequency of the data as included in the probit model. A Annual, Q quarterly,
M monthly data
b‘Data point’ denotes the observation, which is used in the empirical analysis
cSee www.worldbankorg/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm.
dTotal domestic credit (IFS line 32) minus government claims (IFS line 32an) divided by the CPI (IFS line
64; cf. Tornell 1999). The 4-year growth rate is computed on an annual, quarterly, and monthly basis. The
quarterly and monthly measures provide rankings of countries in 1994 similar to Sachs et al. (1996)
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